While, as noted, in most cases, the indicators did their task well and signaled ahead of crises, Indonesia, which has witnessed a meltdown in its currency and a collapse in its banking industry is firmly anchored at the bottom of the list presented in Table 5 .5, as relatively few indicators gave advanced warning. True, the few signals that were coming were from the more reliable indicators, yet using this approach it would not have been labeled "vulnerable." In a similar vein, some of the countries that appear near the top of the list in terms of vulnerability are not the countries that have typically been buffeted by financial markets in the wake of bad news elsewhere. Following the crises in Mexico and Thailand, Argentina and Brazil were at the top of the "hit list" of financial markets--yet, particularly in the case of Argentina, this would be difficult to justify strictly on the basis of the fundamentals reviewed here.
Indonesian characteristic of the silence of signals. The empirical evidence on contagion is still limited to a few papers, but the weight of the empirical results appears to suggest it important. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) examine the issue in the context of OECD countries. They find that knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere significantly increases the probability of a domestic crisis--even after controlling for domestic and external fundamentals. As in Glick and Rose (1998) , they point to trade links as the channel that is a culprit for the transmission of disease. The evidence in Calvo and Reinhart (1996) suggests that cross border capital flows have a "contagious" element, at least in Latin America. Schmukler and Frankel (1996) find evidence of contagion in emerging market funds. Doukas (1988) found evidence of contagion in sovereign interest rate spreads. Indeed, one of the very few empirical studies that does not find evidence of contagion (or in this case, "excess comovement" in equity returns) is Wolf (1997) .
In any case, to the extent that contagion is a force that is at play in international financial markets, being near the bottom of the "vulnerability" list does not preclude a country from having a crisis, as the Indonesian collapse and the recurring bouts of speculation against the Argentinean peso highlight. In what follows, we review briefly some of the theoretical underpinnings for contagion and then move on to assess to what extent crises probabilities increased for other emerging markets following the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997.
Explaining Contagion: Theoretical Underpinnings
Most of the theoretical work on contagion has attempted to provide a framework that allows us to understand how shocks in one country are transmitted elsewhere. Our review of this literature emphasizes its empirical implications in terms of defining contagion, delineating its channels of influence, and testing for its presence.
Defining contagion:
In the only paper (that we are aware of) that examined the issue of contagion in the context of Latin America's debt crisis (Doukas, 1989) , contagion was seen as the influence of "news" about the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower on the spreads charged to the other sovereign borrowers, after controlling for country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals. Other studies, such as Valdes (1995), defined contagion somewhat differently--as excess comovement across countries in asset returns, whether debt or equity. The comovement is said to be excessive if it persists even after common fundamentals, as well as idiosyncratic factors, have been controlled for. A recent variant to this approach is presented in Rigobon (1998) and Forbes and Rigobon (1998), who define contagion more narrowly by requiring an increase in excess comovement in crisis periods. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) defined contagion as a case where knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere increases the probability of a crisis at home, even when fundamentals have been properly taken into account. This is the definition of contagion that we will explore in the remainder of this chapter.
Theories of contagion and their empirical implications:
To explain why crises tend to be bunched, some recent models have revived Nurkse's story of competitive devaluations, which emphasized trade, be it bilateral or with a third party. 1 Once one country has devalued, it makes it costly (in terms of a loss of competitiveness and output) for other countries to maintain their parity. In this setting the devaluation in the second country is a policy decision and its effect on output is salutary. Hence, an empirical implication of this type of model is that we should observe a high volume of trade among the "synchronized" devaluers. 2 Another family of models has de-emphasized the role of trade in goods and services and stressed the role of trade in financial assets, particularly in the presence of information asymmetries. Calvo and Mendoza (1998) present a model where the fixed costs gathering and processing country-specific information give rise to herding behavior, even when investors are rational. Kodres and Pritsker (1998) also present a model with rational agents and information asymmetries. However, they stress the role played by investors who engage in cross-market hedging of macroeconomic risks. In either case, these models suggest that the channels of transmission come from the global diversification of financial portfolios. As such, they have the empirical implication that countries with have more internationally-traded financial assets and more liquid markets are likely to be more vulnerable to contagion. Small, highly illiquid markets are likely to be under represented in international portfolios to begin with and, as such, shielded from this type of contagion. In addition, cross-market hedging usually requires a moderately high correlation of asset returns. The implication is that countries whose asset returns exhibit a high degree of comovement with the infected country (such as Argentina with Mexico or Malaysia with Thailand) will be more vulnerable to contagion via the cross-market hedges that were in place as the crisis erupted.
In addition to these explanations of contagion, Calvo (1998) has stressed the role of liquidity. A leveraged investor facing margin calls needs to sell (to an uninformed counterpart) his or her asset holdings. Because of the information asymmetries, a "lemons problem" arises and the asset can only be sold at a firesale price.
A variant of this story can be told about an open-end fund portfolio manager who needs to raise liquidity in anticipation of future redemptions. In either case, the strategy will be not to sell the asset whose price has already collapsed but other assets in the portfolio. In doing so, however, other asset prices are depressed and the original disturbance spreads across markets.
One potential channel of transmission that has been largely ignored in the contagion literature but that is stressed in this paper is the role of common lenders, in particular commercial banks. U.S. banks had an extensive exposure to Latin America in the early 1980s, much in the way that Japanese banks did during the Asian crisis of 1997. The behavior of foreign banks can both exacerbate the original crisis, by calling loans and drying up credit lines, but can also propagate crises by calling loans elsewhere. The need to rebalance the overall risk of the bank's asset portfolio and to recapitalize following the initial losses can lead to a marked reversal in commercial bank credit across markets where the bank has exposure.
Very few studies have gone beyond establishing that there is contagion or spillovers and attempted to assess the underlying causes. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) attempted to discriminate whether bilateral trade links or similarities to the crisis country in macroeconomic fundamentals, which may lead investors to reassess the risk of the others. Glick and Rose (1998) examined these issues further in a much broader country coverage, while Wolf (1997) attempted to explain the pairwise correlations in stock returns by bilateral trade and other common macroeconomic fundamentals. All studies conclude that trade linkages play an important role in the propagation of shocks. Because trade tends to be more intra-than inter-regional in nature, Glick and Rose (1998) conclude that this helps explain why contagion tends to be regional rather than global. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998b) , also look at trade links--both bilateral and thirdparty--but that paper emphasized financial sector links. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to addressing some of these issues for the Tequila crisis and the Asian flu.
Contagion in the Mexican and Asian Crises: Some Evidence
In this part of this chapter we turn our attention to two recent "contagious" episodes, the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis and the floatation of the Thai baht. Identifying the countries that were affected by the initial crisis is easy; pinning down the channels through which the crisis spread remains the more challenging task. Table 6 .2 summarizes some of the possible channels through which the crisis can spread. Obviously, to the extent that there is herding behavior and investors lump all emerging markets, or perhaps only those in the infected region, together that adds yet another dimension through which the crisis spreads. As far as the affected countries' exchange rate arrangements at the outset of the crisis, these cover the range from currency board to managed float. Of course, it is widely agreed that both the Philippine and Malaysian central banks intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market. Hence, there was a good deal of "managing" in these managed floats. Nonetheless, it appears that none of these exchange rate arrangements succeeded in making the countries impervious to contagion. 
